

# The Effect of Centralistic Political Party Policies in Selection Of Regional Heads in Medan City

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## **1** The Effect of Centralistic Political Party Policies in Selection Of Regional Heads in Medan City

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### ABSTRACT

The problem of the realization of regional autonomy-decentralization will be successfully achieved if in the process of determining regional leaders are still in the shadow of the national political elite. More broadly, this does not provide an opportunity for the people of the region to freely determine their future leaders in the area. To a certain degree, this kind of process will destroy regional democratization. For that reason, the problem to be examined is how the influence of the centralization of political party policy in relation to the election and determination of regional head candidates carried by political parties, we need to discuss in advance what is the cause of the direct implementation of regional head elections and how the role of political parties in recruiting regional head candidates. The research method used is normative legal research. The results showed that the election of regional heads that had experienced a shift from indirect elections in the DPRD to direct elections by the people had constructive consequences for democracy and the conception of popular sovereignty in the context of elections and the role of political parties that were very strategic in being able to carry prospective candidates for heads regions become candidates for regional heads in the regional head election experiencing conceptual ambivalence.

**Keyword : Regional; Head; Party;**

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

The reform agenda that rolled out in Indonesian history, significantly changed the political structure and structure of the Indonesian state administration, this change was realized through changes to the Indonesian constitution. One of the changes in the context of amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution), is regarding the power relations between the central government and regional governments which experienced a shift from centralistic-authoritarian power towards decentralized-autonomous. The application of Law Number 5 of 1974 concerning Principles of Government in the regions which places the position of the region into a local state government has instead set aside the role of the region in various aspects. Political movements from the regional grassroots appeared when the reform agenda rolled out and entrusted the goal of the realization of regional democracy. Strengthening the position of regional democracy is contained in the constitution in Article 18 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution which is accompanied by the loading of the principles of decentralization and regional autonomy. This situation has an impact not only on the process of implementing governance in the regions, but also has an impact on the process of electing regional leaders which necessitates a shift from elections by the DPRD to the people in the region directly. The regional head election as known as pilkada in Indonesia which was held directly began on June 1, 2005, which arrived in the period of 2020 thousands of local elections have been held in Indonesia. The implementation of this election as with the implementation of general elections (elections) certainly cannot be separated from the influence and intervention of political parties in every aspect, both in the

pre-election process, the election (on going), and post-election. Even so, the political reality in the reform era showed a decrease in people's trust (credibility) towards political parties. Political parties seem to fail in understanding their essential functions and goals. So that political parties do not have a strategic role in building a democratic life. On the other hand, the poor institutionalization process also failed to make political parties position themselves as public institutions.

More specifically, the political party's centralistic policy contributes greatly to the destruction of the democratic order in the internal political parties. The determination of regional head candidates in the candidacy of local elections shows an undemocratic reality where decision making authority is only centralized at the top level of national party management. Which even if the regional management rejects policies that are often not taken based on the deliberations, it will lead to dismissal (Sholikin, 2017: 39).

Which on a more complex level will result in internal party conflicts or even to the point of spreading out the community order. When viewed in a historical approach, the highly centralized New Order power provides a trail of local politics that can be divided into two things: (i) elite-led local political control which is a national and regional collaboration or (ii) the emergence of powerful people in the region. The truth is that democratic governance by local people is not really achieved. In reality today it can be seen clearly through the candidacy of regional head candidates in various regions in Indonesia. Specifically, the process of carrying out regional head candidates for the 2020 Regional Head Elections in Medan, there are indications of the strengthening of the centralization of political party policy in determining the regional head candidates who will advance to the simultaneous local elections. So far, the political reality of the nomination of regional heads in Medan City only shows one candidate (independent) who will participate in the election of regional heads (Mayor) in Medan City. This is influenced by the indications of the centralistic policy of political parties at the national level which in their decision making does not heed the arguments of political parties at the local level. When in fact, the reform agenda that includes the legal politics of strengthening the position of the region with the application of the principle of decentralization-autonomy in the implementation of government, must be accompanied by the authority of decentralization-autonomous determination and selection of prospective regional leaders. Somewhat difficult to imagine, the realization of decentralization-regional autonomy will be successfully achieved if in the process of determining regional leaders are still in the shadow of the national political elite. More broadly, this does not provide an opportunity for the people of the region to freely determine their future leaders in the area. To a certain degree, this kind of process will destroy regional democratization.

Whereas it should, the development of regional autonomy and political decentralization is also accompanied by regional autonomy from the political party system, which eliminates the power of central autonomy and the nature of regional dependence on the center. As Harry Mulya Zein explained the importance of political party decentralization as follows: (Eddyono, 2017: 87).

Decentralization of political parties is very important, giving autonomous authority to the DPD and DPC management to determine the regional head candidates that are promoted can hamper the transactional political process. Also noteworthy is the fiscal autonomy of regional political parties aiming at local level political parties to have financial independence in moving the wheels of the organization. Finally, increase the power of civil society to create programs and platforms that are appropriate to the needs of the community.

To answer essential questions related to how the influence of the centralization of political party policy in relation to the election and determination of regional head candidates carried by political parties, we need to discuss in advance what is the cause of the direct implementation of regional head elections and how the role of political parties in recruiting regional head candidates. These two variables will help to provide an answer on how the influence of a very centralized political party policy on the party's central board is even in the hands of a charismatic party chairman who influences the candidacy of regional elections and also to a certain extent affects the internal conditions of political parties in the region.

## 2. RESEARCH METHOD

The research method used is normative juridical legal research method which means that this method is useful to answer legal issues by finding the principles, rules, and legal doctrines (Marzuki, 2005: 35). According to Rahat and Hazan to classify candidate selection methods based on the criteria of the directorate, nomination, decentralization, and voting versus appointment (Katz and William V Crotty, 2014: 180). According to Norris and Lowenduski the decision-making process has two dimensions

related to party power that is deployed, namely centralized or regional and how the formalization of decisions is made namely formal or informal. In this second dimension, there are several models, namely (i) informal-centered, constitutional mechanism with a combination of leadership patronage where the role of members is limited and only serves symbolic functions (ii) informal-regional, leader factions make bargains that place the best candidates, (iii) informal-localized, local officials decide on general procedures for recruitment that are vulnerable to manipulation of small groups, (iv) formal-centered, party central executive executives have constitutional authority to decide on candidates, (v) formal-regional, identical to formally centralized, but the region still has the authority, (vi) formal-localized, constitutional and established national recruitment guidelines that enable the recruitment process that has integrity, transparency and a good gradation of justice (Pamungkas, 2011: 59).

### 3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

#### A. Election of Regional Head as a Consequence of State Form

The rolling reform agenda, significantly changed the political structure and structure of the Indonesian state administration, this change was realized through changes to the Indonesian constitution. One of the changes in the context of the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution), is regarding the power relations between the central government and regional governments which experienced a shift from centralistic-authoritarian power towards decentralized-autonomous. The application of Law Number 5 of 1974 concerning Principles of Government in the regions which places the position of the region into a local state government has instead set aside the role of the region in various aspects (Na'imah, 2016: 153).

This is one of the reasons for strengthening regional authority in the reform agenda. This strengthening can be seen in the norms governing Article 18 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution which gives flexibility to regional governments to manage their own households. The provisions of decentralization-autonomous to regions are regulated in the constitution, are explained through the provisions of the legislation, namely Law Number 32 of 2004 which as amended through Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government. In this provision, it emphasizes distribution of certain functions which become absolute authority between governments. The authority of the central government which cannot be divided into regions is foreign policy, defense, security, justice, monetary and national fiscal, and religion (Article 10 of Law Number 23 of 2014) which then can be submitted to other regions through regional assistance tasks. decentralization. Philipus M. Hadjon explained, decentralization is the authority to regulate and manage governmental affairs which are not solely carried out by the central government, but are also carried out by lower government units in functional and territorial form (Hadjon, et. Al, 1993: 111).

According to Ismail Husin, decentralization is a concept that was born after the realization of the form of centralization. That is, decentralization was born after the centralization of government, and there could not be decentralization before centralization. The provision of the principle of decentralization-autonomous is a form of reform change that leaves the character of the New Order in the form of a centralistic concern with stability and centralized integration (Mahfud MD, 2010: 222).

The direct election of regional heads (Pilkada) cannot be separated from one of the reform agendas to provide democratic and constitutional freedom and authority to develop their respective regions. The Election of Regional Heads became a political path chosen by the Indonesian people. Moreover, in the context of the direct election of regional heads which is a very constructive political breakthrough for democracy and also very significant when seen in the phase before and after reformation which only takes a few years. Direct elections are a process that has broad implications for regions and communities to realize democracy at the local level. Democracy if seen as a process, the direct local election is a process of strengthening and deepening democracy (deepening democracy) as well as a means of realizing good and also effective governance (Hanafi, 2012).

Essentially, direct elections are people's sovereignty to realize democratic principles that include guarantees of individual freedom and equality in political rights (Zuhro, 2011: 23-24). According to Reuschmeyer, the deepening of democracy is an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of practice in substantive democracy, more specifically to respond to the demands of the regional people (Zuhro, 2011: 23-24).

The deepening of democracy is needed to provide facilities for people to get involved in politics. Thus, this will provide a more active and broader opportunity for community involvement in local politics. The emergence of concentration on the transition to local democracy is based on the belief that

(Benito Asdhie Kodiyat MS)

local democracy is a prerequisite for the emergence of democracy at the national level. It is believed, if there is an improvement in the quality of democracy in the region, it will automatically become an effort to improve democracy at the national level. Another reason states that democracy in the regions is an arena of political education for citizens in a democratic society. In other words, there is an element of proximity in which the local government is part of the government that has a fabric of interaction with the people through the election of regional heads as a process of democratization (Marijan, 2010: 170).

According to Larry Diamond, local governments have a strategic role to accelerate the vitality of democracy. Diamond gives a reason that local government can help develop democratic values in its citizens. On the other hand, the government is also working to increase accountability and accountability in its regions. This will provide increased representation of good democracy and will provide impetus for the realization of checks and balances in power in the regions (Marijan, 2010: 170).

Furthermore, the election is used as a space for developing democracy where democratic development includes strengthening the public (political society), strengthening the economic society (economic society) and strengthening the cultural society (cultural society). Deeper, democratic development also touches on aspects of civil society engagement where there is voice, access and control, a bureaucracy that is neutral, usable, provisional, and towards strengthening the rule of law and also institutionalizing the economic and political sectors (Sahdan, 2008: 155-157).

This is also supported by the statement of Goran Hayden in Governance and Politics in Africa who saw the elections as an arena to give birth to local good governance. The creation of local good governance includes three aspects, namely (i) the actor dimension, which wants the elections to erode centralized and centralized power in the hands of a handful of political oligarchies, (ii) the structural dimension, emphasizing voluntary attitudes (compliance), trust, trust (accountability) accountability) and also innovation in the regions. This will open up opportunities for everyone to become a leader, while (iii) an empirical dimension, emphasizing the importance of the role of citizens, responsive leadership and social reciprocity (Hanafi, 2014: 4). In this case, the direct elections provide an urgency to improve the quality of democratic life. Haris argues that, First, the direct election will break the chain of party oligarchy that colors the life of the party in the DPRD, where previously public aspirations tend to be politicized by parties and party elites. Second, the direct election will give birth to a good quality local accountability, where leaders will have more responsibility to the community. Third, direct elections will create political stability and governance at the local level, which will reduce the number of removal and impeachment of regional heads. Fourth, the direct election will strengthen the quality of national leadership selection which is bottom up. Fifth, the direct election will have an impact on increasing the quality of representation because the community has a full share in determining the figure of leader at the local level (Haris, 2003: 106-107).

Although the election and election regime debates do not substantially impact on democratic development. But we need to examine the consequences of what gave birth to the regional head election system (directly) that has been practiced so far. Elections and the electoral system are important aspects in a democratic regime because with them power from the people can be put into practice. Djayadi Hanan said that the government system is a matter of how the branches of executive and legislative powers are formed and ended and how the two are related. While the form of a state is a matter of whether a country consists of only one national government or consists of a number of sub-national governments and how the relationship between these levels of government. The management of power in sub-national government is a consequence of the form of the state and the choices taken (Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2020: 24).

The state in the federal state has the right to choose the leader in the state through simultaneous elections or not. Whereas the unitary state has the choice of legislative and / or executive elections in the regions and how the implementation is a consequence of policy, whether to use autonomy or not. Thus, it can be concluded that the existence of executive and legislative elections at the national level is a consequence of the government system. Whereas the existence of elections at the local level is a consequence of the choice of the form of state and the sub-national governance management system chosen. In the context of Indonesia, the form of state and sub-national government management system adopted is a unitary state by implementing regional autonomy. This has the consequence that regional leaders are chosen from and by the regions themselves. Next, the management of the region becomes a powerful authority of the region itself (autonomous). The autonomy of the sub-national government management system cannot be separated from the regional political agenda in the case of regional head elections. This is because regional head elections are the basis and foundation of regional government management, which can be said that regional head elections are an essential factor in the regional

government system. Therefore, in the context of the candidacy of the regional head candidacy which is currently experiencing an imbalance of the system, where political parties centrally control the policy making to elect candidates for regional heads who incidentally ignores the aspirations of the region (party regional administrators), even though the fact is that constitutionally the regions are an autonomous region that has its own authority to develop its region. This becomes the ambivalence of the system that will destroy democracy itself, moreover that the general knowledge of the community considers that political parties are pillar<sup>20</sup> democracy. Then, how is it possible for a system to run consistently if there is a system deviation in the body of the system (political parties).

### **B. Role of Political Parties in the Recruitment of Regional Head Candidates**

Democracy in the life of the state today is a necessity that is presented as a protector of all human rights. In the level of theory and practice, the state also<sup>11</sup> accompanies the growth of democracy in various parts of the world. Joseph A Schumeter said that, democracy is an institutional plan to achieve political decisions in which individuals gain the power<sup>24</sup> decide the way of competitive struggle over the voice of the people (Krisna, 2003: 15). Simply put, democracy is government from the people, by the people, and for the people (Jurdi, 2019: 51).

That is, individuals have a full share in the arena of democratic processes in a country. Jimly Asshidiqie said that political parties have<sup>41</sup> central position and role in every democratic system. Political parties as pillars of democracy play a liaison role between the state government and citizens. Furthermore, Schattscheider stated "Political parties created democracy" which means political parties form democracy, not vice versa. This makes the political parties as a pillar of democracy which is very important to strengthen the degree of institutionalization (the degree of institutionalization) in a democratic political system, because it will determine the quality of democracy in a country's political life (Asshidiqie, 2007: 710).

Diamond and Gunter describe seven important functions of political parties in relation to electoral democracy. First, candidate nominations, where the contestants represent<sup>2</sup> their respective parties. Second, electoral mobilization, where citizens are motivated by parties to support their candidates and also facilitate their participation in elections. Third, issue structuring, where the party has a focus on managing interests mobilization strategies in various dimensions of issues that have different<sup>2</sup> interests (Diamond, Gunter, 2001: 7-8).

Fourth, represent various social groups, either symbolically or in advancing specific interests. In this case, the function<sup>2</sup> social representation is carried out by political parties when elections are an expression of support to various groups. Fifth, interest aggregation, which will bear the implications of the emergence of public policy coherence as well as the stability of the policy itself. Sixth, forming and sustaining government which is a challenge for political parties in realizing the performance dimension. Seventh, social integration in which political parties play a role in social integration and makes it possible for people to participate effectively in the political process (Diamond, Gunter, 2001: 7-8).

<sup>2</sup> According to Hague and Harop, political parties have a number of functions, namely the articulation and aggregation of interests, political communication, political socialization and political recruitment. First, the articulation and aggregation of interests is<sup>23</sup> function of formulating interests into one construction that accommodates all interests. Second, the function of political communication is directed at<sup>23</sup> bridging the aspirations of the people to the stakeholders of government, in democratic countries political communication carried out by political parties is two-way, namely communication from the top down and from the bottom up. Another case in a communist or totalitarian country, where the flow of political communication is one-way from top to bottom (Hague, Harrop, 2001: 127-169).

Third, the function of political socialization aimed at the orientation of society towards the political life that develops in society. Fourth, political recruitment as a party tool to find and carry out cadre members of political parties to further participate in politics. Furthermore, this process has the aim of maintaining the sustainability of the existence of political parties and always selecting new leaders. Furthermore Pippa Norris stated that the nomination is not only the nomination of elected representatives at the local, regional, national level, but becomes a means of filling public positions. Furthermore, Jimly believes that the function of the party as a means of political recruitment (political recruitment) is indeed intend<sup>5</sup> to be a legitimate vehicle for selecting cadres of state leaders at cer<sup>5</sup> in levels and positions. Although not all positions can be filled by the role of political parties such fields that are not political (political appointment) and may not involve political parties. These positions can be separated into political and technical and professional positions. For example, in regional government

political positions that can be filled through mechanisms involving political parties are only the regional head and deputy regional head, provided that the region is not an administrative region but an autonomous region, which is a consequence of the form of the state and the application of regional autonomy as already mentioned above.

### C. Effects of Centralized Policy on Political Parties in Direct Regional Election

The direct election of regional heads (pilkada) is a consequence of the reform agenda. Implementation of direct elections that began in 2005 using the legal instrument Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government, which then underwent changes through Law No. 8 of 2005 concerning Establishment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 3 of 2005 concerning Amendment to Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government and secondly through Law No. 12 of 2008 concerning the Second Amendment to Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. However, it has subsequently been amended through Law No. 14 of 2014 concerning Regional Government and has been amended twice through Law No. 2 of 2015 and Law No. 9 of 2015 concerning the Second Amendment to Law No. 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government.

If examined further back, through Law No. 5 of 1974 concerning the Principles of Regional Government, the regional head election process is carried out by the DPRD where the main determinants of candidates who become regional heads are the Minister of the Interior, Golkar, TNI and the blessing of the president. This shows that the regional head election process is very partial and centralistic. Then through Law No. 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government, DPRD has the main role to elect regional heads. Which over time, it actually gives an impact that is also not good for democracy, such as the emergence of money politics. Which then changed the authority to elect regional heads from the DPRD to the people directly through Law No. 32 of 2004 for the first election in 2005.

Although the electoral authority has been shifted to the people in theory this has had a significant impact on the construction of substantial democracy in Indonesia. However, the shadows of political party institutions are still a frightening specter in every local election process. One of them can be seen through the process of candidacy of regional head candidates where political parties have a very strong role in determining the pairs of regional head candidates.

In Law No. 32 of 2004 stated that political parties are the only institution that can propose pairs of candidates for regional head. In the direct election period 2005-2008 before the change in Law No. 32 of 2004, political parties have very special powers. In the sense that political parties have the absolute right to propose a pair of candidates in the regional election contestation, in contrast to other institutions. If the candidate pair wants to compete in the elections, the door is only through political parties.

The pattern or framework of institutionalizing the nomination of regional heads uses a party system cause people who want to run for regional head must go through political parties. This can be seen in Article 59 paragraph 1 of Law No. 32 of 2004 which states that the participants of the regional head election and deputy head of the region are pairs of candidates proposed in pairs by political parties or a combination of political parties. In paragraph 2 it states that the political parties referred to in paragraph 1 can register pairs of candidates if they meet the acquisition requirements of at least 15% (fifteen percent) of the total number of seats in the DPRD or 15% (fifteen percent) of the accumulation of valid votes in the general election Regional DPRD member. (Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government). However, in paragraph 3 the opportunity for individual candidacy is opened, but in practice this does not occur because there are no clear governing provisions.

In its formulation in parliament (DPR RI) when drafting the norms of the law, debates arose related to the nomination provisions and who has the right to nominate the pairs of candidates. Which finally reduced to three options for the nomination process. First, all candidates are independent proposed by non-political parties. Second, some candidates are nominated by political parties and some are nominated by independents. Third, all candidates are nominated by political parties with certain voting requirements in the DPRD seats. In the end these options were rejected by the DPR (Pratikno, 2007: 415-438).

Syamsuddin Haris explained that the whole election process process that took place at the party institution tends to ignore the agency of public access. Society tends not to know transparently the selection process of candidates by political parties or political parties combined. Furthermore, the direct local election even though it has provided a constructive shift from previously the power held by the DPRD to the people's power. However, in practice there are many democratic imbalances where there is a lot of public disappointment with the quality of the electoral process in the elections. This is caused

by party elites and political sponsors who hold control of the entire electoral process which in turn erodes the role of the wider community as holders of sovereignty, which in turn voters become a very marginal group in the process of candidacy (Haris in Hanafi, 2014: 7).

For the results of various political dynamics that exist, through Law no. 12 of 2008, efforts were made to reduce party monopolies where the norms in the law provided participation for candidates who would advance through independent channels or individuals in direct regional head elections. Buchler believes that this shift is a political innovation that tends to give birth to more competitive and inclusive regional head elections (Buchler, 2010: 271).

Pratikno also added that this provision would also have a constructive impact on internal political parties, where the independent path would indirectly inspire political parties to prepare cadres with the best figures to compete in political contestation (Pratikno, 2007: 415-438).

Furthermore, if we look at Article 42 paragraphs 5 and 6 of Law No. 10 In 2016, the pair of candidates for regional head must be proposed by the party's regional administrator to obtain a recommendation from the party's central committee. Which is an absolute requirement to apply for registration as a candidate for governor, regent or mayor.

Here we can see, the ideals of decentralization-autonomy in the regions do not run straight with the configuration of policy makers in the body of the political party itself. With simple language we can say, centralization is criticized but still cultivated in the body of political parties which are essentially the pillars of democracy.

In the context of the candidacy of regional elections, the role of political parties is more to the role of providing legitimate nominations. This role tends to be represented by "buying a boat" or may be more compatible if using the term "boat rental" which is common knowledge that buying party formalities as a nominating ticket. Which is destructively exploited by the political elite as a business venue by setting certain tariffs for candidates who will board the boat. It cannot be denied, Robert Michels once stated that political parties are also like organizations in general, which always give birth to oligarchic domination (Michels, 1984: 13-14).

Another note can be seen that in the nomination process, the initiative of candidacy arises from pairs of candidates who feel they have adequate capabilities or financials rather than in terms of party initiatives. This can be excluded if certain regions or parties already have cadres ready to fight. This illustrates that direct elections provide an easy task for political parties to revitalize the role of substantial democracy rather than just being a boat (Hanafi, 2014: 8).

Apart from that, the issue of centralization and decentralization of authority in internal political parties also has a strategic role. The mechanism related to the big authority to the regions to elect candidates or even that authority is in the structure of the central political parties to save the impact of each for each political party. If the choice of political parties is on the side of decentralization, the central board cannot control the election of candidates and will open the space for electing candidates who have no potential to win. And if the choice is on the side of party centralization, it will not have a good impact on the process of cadre formation and maturation of the structure of political parties in the regions. Because political parties prefer names that have the potential to win, the regional head candidates will be determined by the interests of the political party central executive (Nyarwi, 2007: 17-27).

Not only that, the selection process that is centralized and elitist will cause conflict. This is due to the disparity in the choice of candidates between regional and central party administrators. Although this can be resolved through internal party mechanisms, it is not uncommon for these problems to have an unfavorable impact on the party itself, where conflict will develop between the center and the regions.

For example, the case of disparity in the carrying of regional head candidates in Central Java where the Democratic Party DPP carries Totok Mintarto and John M, while the Democratic Party DPC carries the names Warsa Susilo and M Haris. Although the process is in accordance with the instructions of the Central Java Democratic Party DPD. Furthermore, it can be seen from the DKI Jakarta governor election in 2007 where political parties tended to prefer candidates from outside the party rather than from the party's cadres themselves. Where PDIP, PKS and Democrat Party have the right to propose a pair of candidates, the canalization is only followed by two pairs of candidates namely Fauzi Bowo-Prijanto with 19 coalitions and Adang-Dani from PKS, where only Dani Anwar is from political parties (cadres). Saiful Mujani analyzes this phenomenon as a picture of the breakdown of political party cadre, so that it does not have good popularity and electability before the public (Tanuredjo, 2007: 57-59).

In the 2010 Sleman regional elections the same thing happened, where there was a decline in the sovereignty of cadres to be involved in the candidate selection process. Accompanied by strong party pragmatism and transactional patterns for power struggles (Hanafi, 2014: 11).

On the other hand, pragmatism of political parties also has its own impact. This unique phenomenon occurs in Jambi, where political parties are more receptive to positions of lower rank even though they have strong legislative potential. In Jambi Province, the Golkar Party in the 2004 election had a seat of 24.71%, but at the Golkar regional head candidacy only positioned itself as the deputy regional head to assist the candidate from the National Amant Party (Zulkifli Nurdin) (Nyarwi, 2007: 17-27).

The same thing happened in Banten where Golkar in the 2004 legislative election had 24% of the vote but was only able to carry the deputy head of the region (Muhammad Masduki) to accompany the candidates from the PDI-P. In Batam too, PKS with 13.42% of votes was only able to deliver the candidate to become the deputy mayor accompanying the mayor candidate from the Golkar Party.

The political party structure hierarchically consists of the Central Leadership Council to the Branch Leadership Council in the district / city. In the context of the selection of regional head candidates, although the selection process is in the hands of the regions, the decision making is still in the hands of the central management. This problem becomes very interesting to be examined about the recruitment and selection of candidates conducted by the political party.

Cross and Bottomore said that by knowing political recruitment we can find out several things such as (i) showing the real locus of power of political parties, (ii) showing the circulation process of political elites in the party, (iii) because recruitment becomes a central position, where it will explain the type of political party. By identifying the type of party, we will be able to explain the problems that occur in the party (Witianti, Hendra, 2019: 57).

The role of political parties as vehicles to win general elections was also stated by Barrie Axford (Axford, 2002: 376-377). Furthermore, he also explained the function of political parties that are closely related to elections in democratic countries in the world, namely: (i) structuring the vote, (ii) socialization and mobilization, (iii) interest articulation and aggregation, (iv) representation, (v) activist and elite recruitment, (vi) policy and issue development, (vii) legitimation and (viii) organizing government.

The importance of the recruitment function is also expressed by Katz and Crotty (Katz, Crotty, 2014: 123-198) where political parties have three functions namely social function, recruitment function, candidate selection function. In this context, the recruitment function on the agenda of the leadership of the leader in both the maupunj area at the national level discusses things like First, who qualifies for recruitment certification. Second, discuss who is nominating. Third, discuss who is nominated. Fourth, about the consequences of recruitment. Through this function, political parties have a strategic role to prepare qualified leaders who are ready to enter the arena of the electoral battle.

There are two models of political recruitment in a democratic country. First, descriptive style in which is full of primordial bonds. Second, model oriented style, with an ideal standard which is measured by the ability of candidates such as loyalty and the ability to lead (Witianti, Hendra, 2019: 57-58).

Meanwhile, according to Barbara Geddes, there are four models of political recruitment that can be done by political parties, namely: (i) partisanship, taking into account loyalty and slightly ignoring competence, (ii) meritocratic, recruitment of candidates who have high competencies such as technocrats, entrepreneurs, teachers, and experts, (iii) compartmentalization, recruitment based on the appointment of informal meritokasi, (iv) survival, recruitment with the principle of reward and applicant resources that tend to be patronage.

The pattern of candidate selection and decision making in the nomination of regional head candidates depends on the **role of the party** chairperson **in the selection of candidate** candidates, which **in the later stages** is influenced by other factors. According to Labolo and Ilham (Labolo, 2015: 12) the future of political parties and elections in the Indonesian context faces three problems, namely the shrinking of party ideology, lack of finances, and the stagnation of political recruitment. This problem is more or less caused by the strengthening of the character of the party chairman who tends to be centralized in decision making.

However, the problem of political party organization also has its own institutional problems, which to some extent will result in party policy making. Yves Meny and Andrew Knap mentioned the institutional level of political parties in a democratic system depends on three parameters, namely (i) its age, where if the age is older, the party's ideas and values will be more institutionalized (ii) the

depersonalization of organization, where over time personal interests will be undermined by dynamics in internal organization and (iii) organizational differentiation.

To see the party's internal interactions can be seen through formal rules. Based on Law No. 2 of 2011 concerning Amendments to Law No. 2 of 2008 concerning Political Parties which usually consists of structures (i) the highest leadership of political parties at the national level with the name commonly used by the Board of Trustees, the Development Council, the Advisory Council, the Honorary Council, or the Syuro Council, (ii) the Party Central Leadership Council at nationwide, consisting of the Chairperson, Secretary General, Treasurer with representation of at least 30% women, (iii) Regional Leadership Council in the Province and party management at the regional level at least 60 percent of the total number of provinces, (iv) Branch Leadership Board in the district / city with at least 60% of the total provinces in the region are met. Then there are (v) Branch Children Leadership and (vi) Branches reaching remote villages. Structures that are rooted to the "grassroots" become an important tool for the party's recruitment and regeneration process which is indeed tiered and has its own process at each level.

Nevertheless, the structure and institution of the party still has its own color based on the party's internal rules contained in the Articles of Association and Bylaws of the party itself. In general, daily leadership is in the hands of the Chairperson, even though in strategic decision making it is the highest party leader such as the Board of Trustees. Although in certain conditions it is a bit of an anomaly. Where if there is a charismatic figure in the party, the decision making will more or less be influenced that figure. This can be seen in a number of political parties, such as the figure of Megawati in the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the Democratic Party, Prabowo in the Gerindra Party (Witianti, Hendra, 2019: 62).

Indeed political parties have their own AD / ART provisions. But based on Law No. 2 of 2011 concerning Political Parties states that the sovereignty of political parties is in the hands of members, even though in reality the bodies of political parties are only controlled by a few elite leaders. This makes the important decisions in political parties only determined by a handful of powerful figures, namely the party chairperson whose decisions tend to be absolute authoritarian.

According to Siti Witianti and Hendra (Witianti, Hendra, 2019: 63). There are several factors that can encourage the body of political parties to centralize policies specifically towards the determination of regional head candidates. First, it results from a top down system of forming party structures. Which at some level this will cause dependence on the figure. Second, the party does not have good institutionalization. Scott Mainwaring states that there are four dimensions when the party is well institutionalized, (i) there is a stable pattern of party competition, (ii) the party has a strong relationship with the community at the grassroots level, (iii) there is legitimacy from the people that political parties is essential in a democratic country, (iv) in terms of party structure, procedures and routines, the party has a clear agenda, and the process of leadership change in the party body without conflict.

Third, the quality of party institutionalization seen from internal-external and structural-attitudinal aspects. Furthermore, Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp use organizational depersonalization criteria as a benchmark for the institutionalization of political parties. Fourth, is the pragmatism factor where political parties certainly have an interest in winning the elections, which will certainly focus on consideration of electability and the chances of winning for the candidate pair.

The tendency of political parties to vote tends to be pragmatic and unavoidable the birth of divisions within the internal political parties, this can be caused by the recruitment of candidates who have the potential to win big even though not a cadre of the political party. According to Rahat and Hazan, there are two candidate selection systems. First, inclusive (open) where everyone can openly register with some mild conditions (eligible) without any requirements to be a party cadre or even the same color ideology. In which there are two determinants of recruitment of candidates outside the party, namely: (i) the requirements for the guaranteed guarantee or electability of the candidates which can be seen from cross-group, ethnic, religious partners, (ii) cost requirements, this relates to participation in the elections cannot be separated from Election fund needs are very inherent in the current political process.

Second, the pattern is closed or exclusive, where through this system the candidates must meet certain conditions to participate in the selection. Helmi Mahadi said, the more exclusive the selection of candidates, the less democratic the process. But on the contrary, the more inclusive the selection process is, the more democratic the process. Because, in an exclusive mechanism only the party elite alone has a strong share in the selection and determination of candidates (Mahadi, 2011).

In the context of direct regional head elections held simultaneously in several regions in Indonesia, Medan City which is actually one of the major cities in Indonesia also participated in the regional people's party to elect regional head candidates in this case the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Medan who will be implemented in 2020. If seen from the juridical-normative condition of the regulation regarding the nomination of regional heads both through the Regional Government Law, the Political Party Act and the Regional Head Election Shrimp Act, it still opens the possibility for the emergence of the issue of centralism in the nomination policy making by the central political party management. This can be seen from a number of prospective regional heads who are party cadres who have taken part in the party and even in the government, even tend to be potentially not carried out by their own party, which incidentally in terms of participation, loyalty and party contribution is clear. Honestly, Acting figure. The current Mayor of Medan, Akhyar Nasution, who is actually a cadre from the PDI-Perjuangan Party, even has a strong potential is not carried by his own party. Likewise the figure of Iwan Ritonga who incidentally is a Deputy Chairperson of the Medan City DPRD who also has the potential not to be carried by their party because they have not received the "blessing" from the party's central board. Though it can be seen that they have already "pocketed" the blessing of their party management in the area.

In the agenda of improving the selection system for regional head candidates there are several alternative issues, among others, First, the selection process that has been determined by those who become party elites, the party should open as much access to the public as possible to enter this process. Only through open access, public opportunities are open to find out more about the regional head candidates to be promoted. Furthermore, the public can supervise the process of determining the candidates. Second, parties often do not proportionally provide opportunities for their own cadres to advance in the elections, because the party will pragmatically prefer a figure who has a higher chance of winning. This will have implications for the stagnation of regeneration within the party and the emergence of conflicts within the party. At this stage, the party should open up greater opportunities for its cadres to have an opportunity in the nominating process. Third, the process that is often thought to bring up political dowry practices, and therefore the practice of meritocracy-based democracy should be the basis for parties to recruit candidates. Fourth, in terms of the issue of kinship issues in the elections, this chain must be broken with an objective and transparent recruitment mechanism.

Decentralization of political party policy (devolution of power) normatively began to be implemented through Law No. 22 of 1999 until the enactment of Law no. 23 of 2014 has not been able to have a significant impact on the devolution of the nomination of regional head policies in internal political parties. Sholikin gave two offers (Solikhin, 2017: 57-61). First through assertive arrangements related to the decentralization of political parties and the authority of political parties in the regions and poured into the Political Party Law and the Election Law. The party clause, which has so far been patron-client and centralist in character, will be more inclusive if the region has a more flexible role in recruiting candidates which will at some level have an impact on the regeneration of cadre formation at the grassroots party.

Second, through a strict separation between national and local elections. Sholikin continued, this separation has the potential to provide positive signification for party strengthening, (i) separation will provide political education to the public about regional and national political disparities that will indirectly erode the Jakarta-centric stigma. (ii) regional politicians will be more responsive to regional issues and will move the party wheels in the regions, (iii) will build regional issues that are more constructive in daily life in the regions, (iv) politicians will be more "rooted" to the people in area. Third, the supremacy of political parties in the regions will provide executive strengthening in the regions. Where the regional head will also be separated from the central pragmatic interests which will instead reduce the positive regional policies.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

Regional elections that have undergone a shift from indirect elections in the DPRD to direct elections by the people have constructive consequences for democracy and the conception of people's sovereignty in the context of general elections. The direct election of regional heads is a consequence of the form of the state and the pattern of subnational government adopted by a country. In the context of Indonesia, the form of the unitary state and the pattern of decentralized-autonomous systems given to the regions make the regions have their own authority in managing regional households and cannot be separated also in the context of regional head elections.

Political parties have a variety of functions within the democratic system. The function of political regeneration or recruitment in the context of general elections and regional head elections is one of the important and strategic agenda where this agenda becomes the cadre of political parties to continue to exist in society. In the context of regional head elections, political parties have the authority contained in the law to carry out political recruitment to carry out regional head candidates who will fight on the regional head election agenda.

The role of political parties that are very strategic in being able to carry prospective regional heads to become regional head candidates in regional elections experiences conceptual ambivalence. On the one hand, political parties are pillars of democracy that must be in line with the breath of the constitution, which incidentally constitutes the Indonesian constitution governing the government system in a decentric-autonomous manner. But different practices are carried out in the body of the political party itself. Where in the strategic decision making political parties tend to be sentimentalistic or Jakarta-centric and have the potential to neglect regional aspirations.

Agenda for internal and external improvement of political parties is a very important and fundamental recommendation. Given that although political parties are not a structural institution of the state, political parties are pillars of democracy that play an important role in the process of government and the state. Internal improvements through the party's statutes and by-laws and party conventions must be pushed towards being more inclusive by making the strategic agenda for recruiting candidates for regional heads a joint agenda in which party members and administrators of the party are fully involved and carried out transparently. In addition, the improvement of external political parties that starts from the improvement of the law on the governance of regional heads, political parties and regional elections that provide a gap or space for political parties to centralize policies becomes very important.

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